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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THIRTEENTH AND WASHINGTON 
STREETS CORPORATION, a California 
Corporation, · 
Plaintiff and Appellamt, 
-· vs.-
CLARENCE C. NESLEN, ELLIOTT W. 
E\T ANS, H. D. LOWRY, and MARVIN J. 
BERTOCH, 
Defend(}Jyt.ts and Respondoots. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7875 
This is an action for rent to which Defendants an-
swered with the affirmative defense, inter alia, of con-
structive eviction. It is on ap·peal from a judgment ren- . 
de red by the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
against Appellant-Plaintiffs for no cause of action, and 
from a denial by the Court of Appellant's motion to 
amend the judgment, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. The lower Court held that the manner of opera-
tion· and maintenance of the building in question consti-
tuted an eviction of Defendants and· le-gally justified 
abandonment and subsequent non-payment of rent. 
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Appellant is a California corporation. On March 
27, 1948, App·ellant and respondents, a law firm, entered 
into a written five-year lease (Exhibit "A") for certain 
rooms in 'the third floor of the Darling Building, located 
at the corner of Main Street and Third South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The lease was for five years cormnencing 
on May 1, 1948 and ending on April 30, 1953. Rent was 
Three Hundred Ten Dollars ($310.00) per month, pay-
able in advance. 
The Darling Building. is one of Salt Lake City's 
older downtown buildings. It was originally built to 
be used as a department sto~e, and the first floor and 
mezzanine are still used as such. It is almost square in 
shape with no center light well, high "loft type" ceilings, 
large windows, and is five (5) stories high. (R. page 
84). 
The upper floors have not been used for several 
years~ In 1948, the owners of this building had decided 
to convert them into office space. Their plan, which was 
subsequently followed, was to convert one floor at a time 
to such use, commencing with th~ third floor. 
Mr. Kipp, Plaintiff's agent and building Manager, 
stated that it was his and the owner's intention·to main-
tain and operate the building as first-class office build-
ing, at least to the extent the physical structure permit-
ted, and that he intended to le~ase space to first..:class 
tenants ( R. page 84). 
Respondents examined the building before signing 
the lease, checking the entrance, elevators, stairs and 
restrooms. Plaintiff agreed to arrange respondents' 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
spare according to their desires, and did so. Partiti~ns 
"~ere constructed in their suite dividing it into six (6) 
separate offices, a reception room, and a separate law 
library. The roo1ns 'vere lighted accordingly. The total 
area of space let '\vas approximately 1700 square feet at 
the rent agreed to be paid, which was about Two Dollars 
($2.00) per square foot per year. (R. page 79; Exhibit 
··B"). 
Respondents were the first tenants above the depart-
Inent store and went into occupancy in May, 1948. At 
that time, ..._~ppellants had not completed remodeling of 
the floor which respondents occupied. Mr. Kipp, who · 
had long experience in the field of building management 
(R. page 83), testified that the upper floors could have 
been more easily rented if they had been blocked into 
smaller rooms, but th_at this was avoided because it would 
attract undesirable tenants. (R. page 90). The office 
space was gradually filled, and in January of 1950 num-
bered such tenants as the Utah Foundation, the Hart- · 
ford- Accident and Indemnity Company, the Commercial 
Credit Corporation, a Retail Credit Company branch, a 
dentist, a Christian Science reading room, the Utah 
Dental Supply Company, and the office of the Chin-
chilla -Breeders Association of America. (R. page 85). 
These tenancies were augmented at the time of trial by 
the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 
Bausch and Lomb Optical Company, and S. H. Claussin 
Company, watch distributors. (R. page 86). 
Appellant leased space adjacent to the building en-
tranceway on the first floor to a barber shop. Persons 
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entering the building proceeded up a short stairway 
facing the barber shop, and then turned to the right to 
the elevators. This led to some confusion (R. page 37), 
and Appellant therefore constructed a partition between 
the hallway and the barber shop, and posted signs indi-
cating the direction to the elevators. ( R. page 45). Sub-
sequent to respondents' abandonment, Appellant con-
structed a new entrance leading from the street directly 
to the elevators, which was completely separated from 
the barber shop and beauty salon. 
Shortly before the installation of the partition, Ap-
pellants received a letter from Defendant N eslen point-
ing out the desirability of moving a beauty parlor, which 
he represented, from its location on the mezzanine of the 
building to a new place behind the barber shop. This 
was subsequently done. This new ·location had no effect 
on access. to the elevators. Although the hair dryers 
from the beauty salon occasionally partially obstructed 
the back hall leading to the · firetower · stairs, this hall 
was only used when the elevators were ·not operating. 
The elevators op,erated ~til after 8 :00 o'clock, by which 
time the beauty salon was closed (R. page 46), and a 
semi-rigid curtain (Exhibit 2) was pulled across the 
space between the beauty salon and the·hall. (R. page 46). 
At times during the winters of 1948-49 and 1949-50, 
the building was inadequately heated, and overclothing 
had to be worn. Subsequent to the winte~ of 1948-49, · 
a new thermostatic control· was placed throughout the 
building (R. page 36), and after a few adjustments, Mr. 
Kipp testified that it worked satisfactorily, and has been 
so working ever since. 
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• 
The rest roo1ns were at times dirty and odoriferous, 
although the janitorial force had been increased during 
the course of respondents' tenancy to facilitate cleaning 
and building n1aintenance. (R. page 105). 
Elevator service co1n1nenced at about 8 :00 A.M. and 
stoppe~ at about 8:30 P.M. The doors to the building 
'vere locked by the watchman at about 8:00 P.M. and on 
holidays and Sundays. Respondents had keys, but their 
clients, of course, did not, and clients visiting respond-
ents after about 8 :00 P.M. or on Sundays or holidays 
would have to be admitted. 
The lease provided with regard to these matters: 
HEleventh-the lessors shall be further the 
sole judge as to the amount of and time when 
heat and light shall be supplied to s.aid premises, 
and shall be the sole judge of the janitor and ele-
vator service to be supplied." 
With regard to heat, the lease further provided: 
"Heat will be provided from the apparatus for· 
heating the building from 8 :00 A.M. until 9 :00 
P.M. (Sundays and legal holidays excepted) when-
ever such heat shall, in the owners' judgment, be 
required for the comfortable occupation of said 
··premises. Temporary failure to furnish heat shall 
not, however, be construed .as an eviction of the 
tenant and shall give tenants no claim for dam-
ages a~ainst owners, and shall not ju~tify tenants 
in failing to observe and perform any of the obli-
gations under his tenancy ... " RUles wn.d Regula-
tions No. 14 . 
Access to the third floor was. gained either by ele-
vator, when operating, or when available on the main 
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floor for self operation, or by the stairwell. The stair-
wells were given particularly keen surveillance by the 
Fire Marshal because of. the upward reclassification 
of the building, and the Marsh8l's only complaints refer-
red to obstruction of the back corridor by the beauty 
salon operators. ( R. ·page 103). The building manager 
stated that instant action was always taken against the 
salon ope.rators whenever such matters came to his at-
tention, and a threat to cancel their lease was made. (R. 
page 101). 
Respondents made an inquiry at the Newhouse Build-
ing (R. page 74) for substitute space; and inquired fre-
quently at the Continental Bank Building. Inquiries 
at the latter building were unsuccessful until the Spring · 
of 1950 (R. page 74) when space became available there. 
An attempt was made to rescind the lease on a volun-
tary basis (R. page 74) so that respondents could mo:ve 
to the Continental Bank Building. When Appellants 
would not agree, respondents wrote a lette.r dated May 
13, 1950 (Exhibit 5) in which they stated some, but not 
all, of the grievances brought out in testimony, and re-
quested release from the lease without litigation. 
This request was refused by Appellant, and respond-
ents thereupon abandoned the premises on June 30, 1950. 
Despite due diligence, Appellants were unable to relet the 
premises until March 1, 1951. 
The District Court concluded that these acts and 
omissions of Ap·pellant and of other tenants constituted 
an eviction which justified respondents in vacating the 
premises and in not paying rent. It is App·ellant's posi-
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tion that neither the facts found by the Court nor the 
eyidence presented support a finding of constructive 
eviction as a matter of law. Appellants further contend 
that the l"iourfs findings of fact with regard to the loss 
of practice suffered by respondents because of the incon-
veniences eon1plained of, and the conclusion that respond-
ents vacated as soon as they found new premises do not 
conforn1 to the testimony given, nor are they reasonably 
implied therefrom. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I: THE FACTS AS FOUND BY THE LOWER 
COURT DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN EVICTION 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. The acts of omission of Appellarnt do not oon-
stitu.te an eviction. 
B. Respondents ·have not shown Appellant's actions 
to have been made with the intent to evict. 
C. The re:sults of the conditions complained of were 
not grave, substa.ntial and permanent. 
D. Respondents did not aba.ndon the premises as 
a consequence of the conditions complained of, 
nor did they leave within a reasonable time after 
such conditions occurred. Respondents thus 
waived any· defense the conditions might offer. · 
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER 
COURT· ARE NOT JUS.TIFIED BY THE EVI-
DENCE OF RECORD. 
A. There is no evidence presented that such al-
leged inconveniences were "g~eatly to th~ d~tri­
ment of Defendant's profess~onal pract~ce as 
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found by the Court in Filndings of Fact XI, XII, 
XIII. 
B. There is no evidence presented to substantiate 
a Finding of Fact that Defendants vacat-ed said 
premises aas soon as they could find suitable 
quarters for their use," as found by the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FACTS AS· FOUND BY THE LOWER 
COURT DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN EVICTION 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. The acts of omission of Appella!nt do· not con-
stitute am eviction. 
The great majority of the complaints made by re-
spondents involved acts of omission of Appellant or ac-
tions by other ·tenants. Thus, respon~ents complained 
of inadequate elevator service and heat, improper clean-
ing of rest rooms, improper lighting, and the obstruc-
tions· created by th~ barber shop and beauty salon. 
To define such inaction as "eviction" is contrary 
to the original concept of eviction, which derived from 
trespass, 
32 Am. Jur. 231, Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 
246, 
and has been adequately provided for in our law by an 
action for breach of the covenants of rep'air or other simi-
lar covenants. 
Because eviction is a defense to an action for rent, 
some courts have extended the concept to fit the facts 
where they feel· rent should not be paid. The legal fal-
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lacy of this is admirably stated in Tiffany on Real Prop-
erty. 
··An eviction by the landlord is properly an 
a:ffirrnative act on his part, an act of omission, 
involving an interruption or interference with 
the tenant's possession or enjoyment of the prem-
ises. It is, in its nature, a wrongful act which 
involves a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoy..: 
ment. Unfortunately, the courts have occasionally 
lost sight of the true nature of an eviction in this 
respect, and because an eviction is a recognized 
defense to a claim for rent, there is a tendency 
to say that there is an eviction whenever a condi- · 
tion exists on the . premises which the court re-
gards as justifying a failure to pay rent. Some 
courts have, for instance, ap~p1ied the term to a 
mere failure of the landlord to perform cove-
nants which he may have made, the non-perform-
ance of which renders the pr~mises less desirable 
for some particular purposes. Thus, breaches· 
by a landlord of covenants by him to furnish elec-
tric power for uses on the premises, to furnish 
heat, to mend leaking pipes, to make the walls 
watertight, to restore a building burned by fire, 
and to furnish proper elevator service, have each 
been referred to as constituting an eviction. Failure 
of the landlord to put a stop to the acts of other 
tenants which prevent quiet enjoyment of the 
premises has also been held to be a constructive 
eviction. 
"Occasionally the expression has even been 
applied to an undesirable physical condition of 
the premises, not the result of any act or omission 
of the landlord, merely because the tenant has, by 
statute, the right to relinquish possession and re-
fuse to pay rent if such condition is not removed. 
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The mere fact that the tenant is thus given the 
right to refuse to pay rerit on account of such "un-
tenantable" condition of the premises does not 
impose upon the landlord any obligation to rem-
edy that condition, as appears from the fact which, 
it is conceived, is not open to question, that the 
tenant has no right of action against the land-
lord for failure to remove such condition, unless 
he .has entered into a covenant to that effect. 
This being so, the statement that the existence 
of such a condition constitutes an eviction by the 
landlord is equivalent to a statement, it would 
seem, that the landlord may be guilty of an evic-
tion because he fails to do what he is under no 
obligatipn to do. Even when the tenant has enter-
ed into a covenant, the failure to perform which 
results in an untenantable condition, it is not per-
ceived how either the breach of covenant or the 
resulting untenantable condition, or both together, 
can properly be referred to as an eviction, what-
ever may be the effect on the liability for rent. 
"Where the failure to perform a covenant 
does not render the premises untenantable, but 
merely renders their use .for the purposes for 
which they were· rented less convenient and more 
expensive, there is no eviction; in such case, the 
tenant has a remedy by an action for damages for 
breach of the covenant." 
1 Tiffany Real Property, Third Edition, 1939, 
· ·sec. 145, page 238-40. 
That property is unfit for the purpose·s of the lease is 
not, in itself, grounds for constructive eviction. The law 
provides adequate and separate remedies for this. Even 
express covenants to repair and maintain are not the 
basis of constructive eviction. 
'. 10 
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·· ... according to the great weight of au-
thority, a tenant cannot treat the 1nere failure of 
the landlord to perfor1n a covenant to keep de-
Inised premises in repair as a constructive evic-
tion, justifying the abandonment of possession 
of the premis~s. Generally speaking, the tenant's 
remedy is either by an action for damages for 
breach of the covenant, by the making of repairs 
by himself and the recovery of expenses fron1 
the landlord, or by withholding the amount from 
the rent ... " 
3:2 Am. Jur. 242, Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 
257. 
Respondent here has instituted no claim for darn-
ages. The sole issue being that of eviction, the acts of 
omission are not relevant. Even those authorities that 
extend the concept to .include omissions confine these 
to zuillful omissions of the 1andlord. 
"Eviction necessarily being the result of an 
intended, willful, wrongful act, it must be by a 
willful- omission of duty or a commission of a 
wrongful act." 
Barrett v. Boddie, 158 Ill. 479, at 485. 
The.re is no evidence here that the omissions complained 
of were of a willful nature. To the contrary, as will be 
shown in detail later in this brief, Appellant's acb' with 
regard to acts of omission showed an intent to improve 
conditions. 
The great majority of complaints made by respon~-
ents were with regard to acts of omission. The Court's 
findings of fact which it held justified abandonment by 
respondents were confined to deficiency as to heat, 
11 
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janitor service, elevator service and lighting. These 
were, if anything, acts of omission by Appellant. The 
Court found the halls to be obstructed at times and the 
entrance to be offensive in appearance-these were con-
ditions created, if at all, by actions of another tenant, 
and Ap·pellant's only act would be one of omission-i.e., 
failure to prevent a fellow tenant from so acting. The 
sole act of commission by Appellant found by the Court 
was the locking of the building's front door after 8:00 
P.M. and on Sll.ldays and holidays. The court included 
such acts of omission in its findings as being material 
and relevant to an eviction, citing such acts in its find-
ings of fact, and stating as a conclusion of law, 
"That the manner in which Plaintiff operated 
and maintained the premises constituted an evic-
tion of the Defendants from said p·remises." 
It is mere speculation as to whether the Court would 
have come to the same result by considering the one act 
of commission alone. Acts of omission are irrelevant 
and immaterial to a question of constructive eviction, 
and yet they were used to a considerable extent, as shown 
by the space devoted to them in the Court's findings of 
fact. As such immaterial and irrelevant evidence cannot 
be segregated or omitted from any conclusion of law 
drawn from such. finding of fact, it is submitted that the 
Court erred in basing its conclusions on such findings. 
B. Respond.ents have n.ot shown Appellant's act·ions 
to have been ma.de with t.he intent to evict. 
·The law of ,eviction has shown gradual exp·ansion 
of the facts encompassed therein. The old common law 
12 
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required actual ouster or physical dispossession by the 
landlord. This rule has been modified by the concept 
of ''constructive eviction." The boundaries of this have 
not been, as yet, clearly defined. Of the concept's several 
components, the question of intent is the least clear at 
all. However, the authorities seem of one mind with 
regard to this question; e.g. : 
"An untentional act or omission of the land-
lord, or by those acting under his authority or 
with his permission, that pern1anently deprive~ 
the tenant without his consent of the use and 
beneficial enjoyment of the demised ·premises 
or any substantial part thereof, in consequence 
of which he abandon·s the premises, constitutes 
a constructive eviction." 
52 C.J.S. 171, § 455. 
"As a rule, in order to constitute a construc-
tive eviction, acts or omissions of a landlord in 
interference with his tenant's use and enjoyment 
must indicate an intention on his part that the 
tenant shall ·no longer continue to hold and enjoy 
the demised premises." 
. 36 Corpus Juris 263, Sec. 989. · 
· "The landlord's interference with a tenant's 
use and enjoyment must be substantial and in-
tentional, and their trespass is not sufficient to 
constitute a constructive eviction. And the act 
or omission complained of must be that of the 
landlord and not merely that of a, third person 
acting ~ithout his authority or permission." 
36.Corpus Juris 262-263, Sec. 988. 
"In order that an eviction may take place as 
a result of acts on the part of the landlord involv-
13 
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ing merely an interference with the tenant's pos-
ses.sion and enjoyment as distinct from an actual 
dispossession, it is necessary that they be such as 
to indicate an intention on the landlord's part to 
deprive the tenant of the possession." 
2 Tiffany, L(JJYI)dlord and ·Tenant, Sec. 185, 
Sub Sec. B., Page 1259. 
". . . as has ·been said in a number of cases, 
acts of. the landlord to constitute constructive 
eviction must be of a grave and permanent char-
acter clearly indicating his intention to deprive 
the tenant of beneficial enjoyment of the premises 
demised to him, to which the tenant yields, aban-
doning the possession within a reasonable time~" 
32 Am. Jur. 232, Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 
246. 
"The mere act or a default on the part of the 
landlord which renders the premises uninhabit-
able or untenantable is not sufficient if that act 
or default is. not accompanied by an intention on 
the ·part of the landlord to affect the enjoyment 
of the premises demised." 
32 Am. Jur. 235, Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 
249. 
Such intention is, of course, not exclusively for the 
landlord to determine. 
Central Busilness College vs. Rutherford, 47 
Col. 277, 107 Pac. 279, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
637. 
Moreover, tenants may be aided by. the usual pre-
sumption in cases of intention that the landlord intendB 
the natural consequences of his acts. 
14 
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~~The intent to evict may be indicated by the 
arts of the landlord. The intention of the land-
lord to eYict or deprive the tenant of the enjoy-
nlent of the premises may be presumed from the 
character of the act, if the necessary result o{ it 
is to depriYe the tenant of the beneficial enjoy-
Inent of the pre1nises." 
3:2 A.~nz. J ur. ~36, Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 
249. 
··To constitute a constructive eviction, there 
Inust be an intention on the part of the landlord 
to evict. 
'The intent with which .the act is done 
n1ay be an actual intent, accompanying and 
characterizing the act, or it may be inferred 
fron1 the act itself.' 
Skally vs. Shute, 132 Mass. 367. 
'Where the issue was whether or not 
there was an eviction of a tenant, the inten-
tion of the landlord is material.' 
8 Encl. Ev. 65. 
"The consensus of judicial opinion seems to 
be that the act must amount in law to . a willful 
trespass, which is but another way of saying that 
a;n intent to regain possession must be shown, or 
that the landlord has so wantonly or willfully 
interfered withthe quiet enjoyment of the tenant, 
that an intent to oust will be presumed." 
Thompson vs. R. B. Realty Company, 105 
Wash. 376, 177 Pac. 769, at 770. 
For a clear summary of the history of cases in the 
State of Washington on the development of the concept 
of intention, see: 
15 
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Cline vs. Altose, 158 Wash. 119, 290 Pac. 809 
at 811-12. 
There are no Utah cases directly in point. Barker 
vs. Utah Oil Refining Oompan;y, 111 Utah 308, 178 Pac. 
2d, 386, is the closest. This case .was an action for rent, 
to which Defendants raised the defense of constructive 
eviction. Defendant appealed, assigning as error, inter 
alia, the Court's ·holdings that the evidence admitted, 
together with that tendered (the exclusion of some of 
this was assi.gned as further error), did not constitute 
an eviction~ 
There was a dispute as to the amount of land co\Tered 
by the lease, which on its face included a dance hall· 
together with a service station, while· Plaintiff claimed 
it should cover the service station alone. The dance hall 
was c<)nverted from a garage by Plaintiff subsequent 
to the lease, and Defendants claimed this to be a con-
structive eviction. 
The Trial Court heard no evidence as to the extent 
of the .lease's coverage, although ·the findings of fact 
included a finding that the lease was confined as Plaintiff 
contende~. As the coverage was held a control~ing issue, 
this Court ruled this prejudicial error. 
With regard to eviction, the Trial Court ruled that 
because Plaintiff remained in the operational control of 
the premises, Defendant could not prove eviction regard-
less of Plaintiff's acts. This Court held that the question 
of possession was not in issue by the pleadings, and thus, 
evidence as to eviction would·not be barred as the Trial 
Court had ruled. This Court held that suit for a non-
16 
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payment of rent assumes possession by the Defendant 
while the pleading of eviction by Defendant also assumes 
possession. It was in this context, and this alone, that 
this Court turned to Black's Law Dictionary to show 
that acccording to that source, both a definition of actual 
eviction and constructive eviction include the element of. 
possession. The use of the definition cited for any 
other purpose would be pure dicta at best. Barker vs. 
Utah Oil Refining Company, supra, gave no sanction to . 
the Dictionary's concept of the role. of intent here. 
Thus, the statement in Black's Law Dictionary that 
''there is constructive eviction when the former (land-
lord) without intent to oust the latter (tenant) does 
some act * * *" must stand or fall on the case law that · 
supports it. Black's Law Dictionary cites R-ealty Go. vs. 
Fuller, 33 Misc. Rep. 109, 67 N.Y. Supp. 146; Talbott 
vs. English, 156 Ind. 299, 59 N.E. 857; General Industrial 
lt Manufacturing Co. vs. American Ga.rment Co., 76 Ind. 
App. 629, 128 N.E. 454-455; Santrizos vs. Public Drug 
Co., 143 Minn. 222, 173 N.W. 563-4. 
Examination of these cases reveals the surp·rising 
fact that o~y one of these can be said to fully substanti-
ate the absence of intention, while others are in agree-
ment with our contention herein, or are completely silent 
in the matter. 
Thus, in Realty Co. vs~ Fuller, supra, an action for 
rent with the alleged defense of constructive eviction, 
the Court held for the landlord, and in reversing the 
lower Court, said : 
"To constitute a constructive. eviction, there 
17 
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must be an intentional and injurious interference 
by the landlord, which deprives a tenant of the 
beneficial enjoyment of the demised premises, or 
materially impairs such beneficial enjoyment* * *. 
An eviction cannot be predicated· on acts or. con-
duct, however wrongful or distressing, unless 
committed, encouraged or connived at by the 
landlord. He is not responsible for the conduct 
of other tenants acting within their rights in their 
own apartments * * *. 
"But the defense is not without other infirm--
ities. Where the right to abando·n pren1ises exists, 
the tenant n1ust be removed, with reasonable 
promptitude, after the circumstances creating the 
eviction arise; and, if he fails to do so, his right 
to repudiate the hiring is lost * * * .. He testified 
that the annoyance complained of began in N ovem-
ber, 1899 and continued from time to time until 
the latter part of April, 1900, when he removed 
from the building. The retention of the premises 
for such a period after the commencement of the 
alleged annoyan~e was a confir1nation of the 
tenancy, and must be treated as an election by 
the tenant to perform the covenants of the lease 
and to retain its benefits." 
Santrizos vs. Public Drug Co. was an action for rent, 
. with the usual defense. The Court, on holding for the 
. # 
landlord, summarily defined constructive eviction, and 
did not mention the element of intent at all. 
Talbott vs. English, supra, was another action for 
. . 
rent, in which the landlord prevailed despite a plea 
by the tenant of constructive eviction. ·The Court here 
uses several quotations and makes reference itself to 
intention ·as a requisite to "eviction" (not more par-
18 
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ticularly specified) and only after this discussion, does 
it 1nake a definition of constructive and actual eviction 
\Yhich distinguishes between the. two on the ground, 
among other things, of intention. However, any such. 
definition would have been more dicta in that case as 
' no constructive eviction was held to exist. 
Only General Industrial & Mfg. Co. vs. American 
Garnzent Co. appears to support the dictionary's defi-
nition, and only then to the extent that it quotes the 
Court in Talbott vs. English, sup-ra; and did. allow the 
defense of constructive eviction to prevail. There was 
no question of intent in the case, and it was not dis.cussed 
further. 
Even assu,ming General Industrial &_Mfg. Co. vs. 
American Garment Co. to be authority on_ the point, 
it is clearly against the great weight of authority refer-
red to above, and can only be termed a seldom followed,· 
seldom cited minority rule. 
The Barker vs. Utah Oil Refining Company case 
supra, is not authority for the proposition that Utah 
follows this minority rule. 
Respondents here made no attempt to show any ac-
tual intent to deprive them of beneficial enjoyment on 
the part of appellant. At best, they must argue that such 
intent was reasonably presumed from the facts. 
Yet, rather than p-rogressive deterioration of the 
annoyances complained of, one sees that the landlord 
has a record of consistent impro~ement. The first winter 
the building was used for offices, there were heating 
difficulties. By· the second winter,· the landlord had 
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installed a completely new thermostatic control system, 
which after a time for adjustments, has. worked without 
complaint, according to the testimony of the building 
manager. This is borne· out by the fact that the building 
is still filled. Confusion as to the main entrance was 
soon discovered. The :rrta.nagemen t first had a partition 
. ' 
constructed to screen off the barber shop. S.ubsequently, 
when this proved not completely satisfactory, they con-
str-ucted an entirely new entrance from the street directly 
to the front of the elevators, and completely cut off the 
barber shop by a separate access to the street. 
The cleaning and janitorial staff was increased (R. 
page 105). · Care . was taken to plan the fourth floor in 
the same manner as the third (i.e. without inner rooms), 
so as to continue to attract only the higher class tenants 
who demanded such planning. 
The chain of imp·ro:vements of progressively better 
service does not infer an intent to evict-rather, it infers 
the converse. It infers the desire of the landlord to 
accommodate itself in every way t:Q.at the physical sur-
roundings allow to re.tain its tenants. 
It is submitted that the Trial Court erred in not 
ruling on the question of intention in its findings of fact 
and could not have found· such intention, either actual 
or presumed, from the facts found. 
C. The results of the conditions complained of were 
not grave, substa;ntial and perma~nent. 
The law requires a certain quantum of deprivation 
of beneficial enjoYment. 
20 
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''However, not all wrongful acts of the lessor 
"'"hich interfere with the enjoJinent of the prem-
ises bY the lessee· amount to a constructive evic-
tion. To constitute a constructive eviction, the 
interference by a landlord with the possession of. 
his tenant or with the tenant's enjoyment of the 
demised premises, n1ust be of·a substantial nature, , 
and so injurious to the tenant as to deprive hirn 
of the beneficial enjoJJnent of a part or the whole 
of the demised premises * * * .. " 
32 Am. Jur. 232, Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 
246. 
HA constructive eviction occurs only where, 
through the landlord's acts, the tenant has bee~ 
substantially deprived of the beneficial enjoyment 
of the demised premises. Not. every breach of 
covenant . for wrongful ·act on the p·art of the 
landlord constitutes an eviction. If a tenant has 
not actually been removed from the' premises, he 
can establish an · eviction ·only where he shows 
that the landlord's acts depTived him substantially 
of the consideration of the rental which he agreed 
to pay." 
Bookman vs. Polachek, 165 N.Y.S. 1023, 1024. 
"The foregoing cases plainly do not announce 
the rule of any interference by the landlord with 
the possession of the tenant, however slight, will 
work a constructive eviction, but, on the contrary; 
hold that the interference must be of a substantial 
nature, and so far ·injurious to his rights to de-
·prive him of the beneficial use and enjoyment of 
the premises." 
Cline vs. Alto.se, 158 Wash. 119, 290 Pac. 809, 
812, 70 A.L.R. 1471. . 
"That eviction must be, 'not a meTe trespass, 
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but something of a grave and permanent char-
acter done by the landlord for the intention of 
depriving the tenant of the enjoyment of the 
demised premises'; and * * * more fully and 
accurately defined as 'an act of a permanent 
character done by the landlord in order to deprive, 
and which had the effect of depriving, the tenant 
of the use of the thing demised, or of a part of 
it.' " 
Upton vs. Townend, 17 C.B. 30, cited in 
Meeker vs. Spalsbury, 66 N.J.L. 63, 48 
Atl. 1026, 1027. . 
Applying this law to the instant facts,. one sees at 
most a series of minor, petty annoyances. Respondents 
introduced no evidence that their practice suffered as a 
result of these inconveniences. 
Much testimony was devoted to the locking of the 
building doors after about 8 :30. at night. Despite respond-
ents' testimony that nocturnal labor was "not unusual" (R. 
page 43) it would appear that even with such industrious 
and able lawyers as respondents unquestionably are, the 
great majority of their labors, like that of the entire 
legal profession, and the business world in general, is 
confined to the twelve hours between 8 :00 A.M. and 
8:00 P.M. 
Thus, mere impairment of access, not amounting 
to exclusion, during such p·eripheral working time could 
not be termed a grave, substantial or permanent impair-
ment over the entire time of tenancy. 
No stronger statement of respondents' alleged griev-
ances could be expected than .from the list contained in 
respondent's letter in which they sought a release from 
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their tenancy. (Exhibit 5). Yet, in this letter, no mention 
is Iuade \Yhatsoever of the locked doors. One can only 
imply that the inconvenience of the locked doors was 
not eonsidered significant of mention at. that time and 
\vould be hardly termed "grave, substantial or per-
nlanent." Only upon the advent of litigation did it 
assume significance in even respondents' eyes. 
This is not a case where the lease, the instrument 
which creates the legal relationship which is now in 
dispute and through which all problems with regard to 
such relationship must initially be viewed, is· silent. 
It is not even a case where the lease is ambiguous as to 
·Inost elements in dispute. 
One should first turn to this instrument. Indeed, 
except in the case of omission, ambiguity or wanton and 
flagrant. abuse of discretion. granted therein, the law 
prevents the parties from turning elsewhere. An in spec-. 
tion of that document shows that it effectively deals 
with most of the problems in dispute. Thus, the lease 
provides: 
"The building will be open from 8 :00 A.M. 
until 12 :00 P.M~ Tenants desiring the use of office 
before or after those hours should apply at the 
building office for permission." Rules amd Reg-
ulations No. 25. 
The only dispute, therefore, appears as to the three 
and a half (30) hours from about 8 :30 to midnight 
during which the building was locked. Even at this 
time, the building was "open" (i.e. accessible to tenants) 
by means of the keys furnished them. 
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Moreo:ver, the lease provides furthe·r: 
"Night· Watch-After 7 :00 P.M. the building 
is in charge of the night watchman, and every . 
person entering or leaving the building is expected 
to be questioned by him as to his business in the 
building, if unknown to him." Rules and RegUla-
tions No. 23: 
. This is the only provision of the lease in bold faced 
type. It is assumed special importance . was attached 
thereto. The barring of access of non-tenants, unless 
admitted by the tenant or by the watchman, may be 
considered a reasonable interpretation of this provis~on . 
. With regard to the heat, janitorial, and el~vator 
service, it is expressly stated as a term and condition 
of the lease : 
"Eleventh-The lessors shall be further the · 
sole judge as to the amount of and time when 
heat and light shall be supplied to said premises, 
and shall be the sole judge of the janitor and 
eleva tor service to be supplied." 
This clearly cannot be ignored .. Conceding that s-uch 
a ·clause would probably not protect a landlord from 
flagrant or wanton abuse of the discretion given therein, 
it is clear that these services, even as found by the 
Court, were only found "inadequate." The Court found 
as fact: 
VII 
"That on frequent occasions, during the cold 
months when defendants occupied the premises, 
there was inadequate heat and defendants and 
their. employees and clients were obliged to wear 
heavy winter overclothing." 
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VIII 
~·That the janitor service to the premises 
supplied by the plaintiff wa.s inadequate." 
IX 
. ~'That the restroon1 facilities furnished by the 
plaintiff for the use of defendants, their employ-
ees and clients were inadequate and were not 
kept clean, properly ventilated or adequately sup-
plied 'vith soap, towels and toilet paper." 
X 
"That the janitor service of the halls, stair-
ways and lobby was inadequate." 
·XII 
"That the plaintiff failed to furnish elevator 
service after 8:00 P.M. on week days and on Sun-
days and holidays, which greatly inconvenienced 
the defendants and which· was a detriment to their 
professional relationships with clients who were, 
on frequent occasions, obliged to come to defend-
ants' offices, located on the third floor of said 
building by way of the stairways which were, 
on numerous occasions, totally ~unlighted and also 
used as a latrine by p·ersons unknown." (Empha-
sis added). 
Moreover, with regard to heat, the lease further . 
provided: 
"Heat will be provided from the apparatus 
for heating the building from 8 :00 A.M. until 
9:00 P.M. (Sundays and legal holidays excepted) 
whenever such heat shall, in the owners' judg-
ment, be required for the comfortable occupation 
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of said pren1ises. Temporary failure to furnish · 
heat shall not, however, be construed as an evic-
tion of the tenant, and shall give tenants no 
claim for damages against owners, and shall not 
justify tenants in failing to observe and perfor1n 
any of the obligations under his tenancy * * *." 
R·ules and Regulations No. 14. 
Respondents, by their profession, are versed in the 
art of contract negotiation. They are learned in the 
legal sanction of agreement. It would be unlikely that 
they would become parties to this ag.reement not fully 
cognizant of its provisions, and respondents do not allege 
otherwise. In these matters expressly covered by con-
tract, it is submitted that respondents must not only 
show that such conditions resulted in a grave, substantial 
and permanent deprivation of their beneficial enjoy-
ment, but they must go farther. They must· show that 
there was a wanton and flagrant deprivation of this 
enjoyment. Respondents did not approach ·the first 
requirement, let alone the second. 
It is clear that this· is not the case of the poor lay 
tenant be1ng coerced, intin~idated and misled by a cor-
poration and its battery of legal counseL The very 
profession of these tenants is the drawing and inter-
pretation of legal instruments. One may wish to pre-
serve the term "constructive eviction," which gives to 
the law an equitable flexibility in the field of the landlord-
tenant, and yet clearly see that to apply it to the case 
where the lease provisions are clear with regard to this 
matter, and where the lessees are men trained by their 
profession in the sanctity of con~ract and the importance 
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of the 'Yritten word, is to say that such leas~ provisions 
shall never be enforced. If men as p·rominent in the bar 
of this State as respondents are not bound· by their 
'vritten contract, then may not any tenant subsequently 
'vishing escape from his lease justifiably ask, "Why 
should I be bound~" 
The complaint of obstructions in the stairwell ·by, 
and odors from, the main .floor beauty salon presents 
the problem of acts of other tenants. The law is clear 
in this respect. 
~~A landlord is not responsible to one tenant 
for the acts of another tenant which are not 
expressly or impliedly authorized by him; such 
.act cannot be treated as a breach of a covenant 
for quiet enjoyment or as a constructive evic-
tion, unless the landlord is shown to be in some 
way responsible therefor. But where the act or 
conduct of which complaint ·is made has the ex-
pressed or implied approval of the landlord, it 
may afford a basis for the claim of constructive 
eviction." 
32 Am. Jur. 247-48, Landlord and Tenant, 
S·ec. 263. 
The evidence shows no approval of such act . by 
appella~ts, but rather drastic steps to force the tenant 
to eliminate such practice. Moreover, it was upon the 
urging of respondents that the beauty salon was given 
its allegedly objectionable location. lri the letter written 
by Defendant N eslen. (Exhibit C) he states that there 
would be "ample space" for such enterprise behind the 
barber shop, and the letter refers to this location as 
the "ideal solution." Admittedly, Defendant Neslen was 
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merely presenting the arguments for a client. However, 
it would take objectivity of a remarkable type for coun-
sel to advocate an issue for a client which, if decided in 
his client's favor, would adversely affect counsel himself 
in a very personal way. Nothing happened ·upon the 
removal of the beauty salon to its place adjacent to the 
entrance that could not have been reasonably fore-
seen. The results, particularly in the light of respond-
ents' advocacy, could not he termed grave, substantial 
or permanent impairment. 
One fact .stands out concerning all of the conditions 
complained of by respondents. These were all conditions 
applicable to all of the tenants of the building. Respond-
ents were not the sole tenants nor were they the subject 
to discrimination by Appellant .or its agents. Thus, if· 
the landlord's actions created a grave, substantial or 
permanent impairment of respondent's beneficial enjoy-
ment and e.victed them, it would create the same for all 
tenants. Yet, respondents' ahandonment.was not marked 
by an exodus of their fellow tenants. In fact, Appellant 
has retained the remainder and has added to this the 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 
Bausch and Lomb, and several other tenants of like 
caliber. 
"Inadequacy" is not grave, substantial or perman-
ent impairment. It is contended that respondents have, 
as a . matter of law, not met the requirements as to 
sufficiency of impairment to the extent of constituting 
an eViction. 
D. Respondents ·did not abandon the premises as 
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a consequence of the conditions complained of, 
nor did they leave u'i.thin a reasonable time after 
such conditions occurred. Respon,dents thus 
waived any defense the conditions might offer. 
The law in this respect is clearly stated in American 
J·urisprudence: 
~~Abandonment of premises by the tenant 
within a reasonable time after the wrongful act 
of the landlord is essential to enable the .tenant 
to claim a constructive eviction ba.sed upon that 
'vrongful act, or to defend against liability for 
rent on account of such act * * *. Possession 
must be given up by the tenant in consequence 
of the landlord's acts, and those acts must be 
such as to justify the tenant in doing so." 
32 Am. Jur., page 236, Landlord and Tenant, 
Sec. 250. 
Such a waiver is most clearly evident with regard 
to the failure to furnish heat. 
32 Am. Jur., 243-4, Landlord and Tenant, 
Sec. 259. · 
Here respondents abandoned at the end of June 
when there was no heating problem. Th~y had paid 
their rent up until June 30. Such facts come squarely 
within the province of: 
Orcutt vs. Ish.ani, 70 Ill. App. 102, cited in 
Baptist General Convent.ion vs. Wright, 
276 Pac. 777 at 782. 
There the Court said: 
"A tenant remaining in possession and pay-
ing rent not only for months during which a cause 
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of complaint existed, but for several months after-
ward, is estopped from setting up such complaint 
and justification of an abandonment of the prem-
ises * ·* *. Appellants' principal defense was a 
breach by Appellee of her agreement and duty 
to furnish a requisite amount of steam, heat and 
hot water. All the evidence upon that question 
related to the winter months and cold weather 
from February 15, 1894 to the end of June, 1894, 
during all of which time, and three months longer, 
the Appellant paid her rent * * *. Appellant 
herself testified that she moved out because she 
was 'afraid to try it the rest of the winter.' In 
other words, she moved out because of something 
she feared in the future and not because of what 
existed * * * in the past. All complaints that 
may have existed in the past were waived by 
the Appellant by paying all rent for the months 
in which occasion for complaint existed * * *. 
A lessee is not at liberty to select out such por-
tion of the term as she is pleased to enjoy and 
repudiate the balance." 
Waiver is particularly important with regard to 
heat. 
"It is, however, necessary in order to justify 
an abandonment on the ground of the landlord's 
failure to furnish heat that such failure must 
have continued to the time of the abandoninent: 
a tenant cannot justify his abandonment by rea-
son of the landlord's failure to furnish heat if, 
at the time, such failure has ceased." 
32 Am. Jur. 243:, Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 
259. 
The other conditions complained of were all of long 
duration. They did not Increase in magnitude during 
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at least the last v-ear of tena11cv. For a court to find 
.. . 
the cause and effect relationship between those con-
ditions and the abandonment, it was necessary for re-
spondent to prove that the abandonment was within 
a reasonable time after such offense. 
75 .A.L.R. 1114. 
The facts clearly do not show this. The barber shop 
and the entrance way were there soon after respondents 
moved in in 1948. The beauty salon was in its allegedly 
objectionable position over a year prior to respondentsi 
abandonment. No evidence was submitted by respond-
ents as to a deterioration in janitor or elevator service. 
By respondents' testimony, they existed in the· same con-
dition for the entire time of the occup-ancy (R. page 73). 
Respondents contend that they could delay abandon-
ment until they found a new location. The authority 
for such a contention seems indeed scant, being limited 
in the sole annotation, 75 A.L.R. 1114,_ at 1119 to an 
English case of 1840; Coure vs. Goodwim, 9 Car. & P. 
378, and the casual reference to such a justification for 
delay, when combined with mariy other extenuating 
facts, as s.omething which the jury might consider, Rome 
vs. Johnson, (1931) Mass., 174 N.E. 716. 
However, even assuming such a principle to be 
established, this did not give respondents license to shop 
around and select the best accommodations, or even 
more clearly, to merely wait until the best accommoda-
tions became available. The very requisites of a con-
structive eviction are that the beneficial enjoyment has 
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become intolerable. The longer the delay in moving, 
the less likelihood that the complaints impaired enjoy-
ment sufficiently to constitute eviction. 
What are the facts here~ Re~pondents' only specific 
testimony on the subject is to the effect that they made 
inquiry at the Newhouse Building, and "on occasion'' 
at the Continental Bank Building (R. page 74). No 
inquiry was made at any other building in the City (R. 
page 74). In the Sp-ring of 1950, respondents finally 
found space in the Continental Bank Building (R. page 
74). Only then did they make actual efforts to cancel 
their lease with Appellant (R. page 48). · 
It is clear that the cause and effect relationship 
present in this case was between the availability of 
space in the. Continental Bank Building and subsequent 
abandonment, and not between the ·inadequacy of the 
Darling Building and subsequent abandonment. 
The burden of proof to show the required causal 
connection was upon respondents. 
Automobile Supply Co. vs. Scene-in-Action 
Corporation, 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35, 69 
A.L.R. 1085; 
Annotation, 75 A.L.R. 1114 at 1116. 
By respondents' own testimony, the availability of 
office space was critical in the City (R. page 73). Yet, 
despite the admitted difficulty, respondents made only 
an inquiry at one other office building and then waited 
for space to become· available in the newest office build-
ing in the area. An office shortage. ·may extend the time 
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of reasonableness, but to so extend the time it is sub-
mitted that respondents must show that they took the 
extra care to locate new quarters that' the exceptional 
situation requi~ed. This was not done here. 
Cases of record seldom extend the time for claiming 
eviction beyond three ( 3) months. Indeed, the only 
.... -\..L.R. annotation on the point says : 
"In the great majority of cases abandonment 
after a month has been held not to have been 
within a reasonable time. There have been sev-
eral cases where this has been held as a matter 
of law." 
75 .A.L.R. 1117. 
One court has put the matter succinctly. 
"(Although) I am satisfied that Defendant 
was annoyed by some of Plaintiff's actions * * * 
The law is clear that the tenant has only a reason-
able time after the alleged eviction within 'vhich 
to exercise his right to vacate the premises, and 
if he fails to do so, he loses that right. Certainly 
the Defendant's occupancy from March until 
October 1, during practically all of which time 
the alleged cause of abandonment continued, 
would operate as a waiver." (Ellis vs. McDermott,. 
147 At. 236, 2·38). 
The law does not look lightly upon eviction charges. 
As Beasley Ch. J., said: 
"The legal effect of eviction is so penal, that 
the doctrine is not to be favored * * *." (Birck-
head vs. C·ummitns, 33 N .J .L. 44 at 56) . 
Eviction should not be a means of relief for a tenant 
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who, for reasons of prestige or other motives, chooses 
to move to more desirable quarters, presenting a cata-
logue of mere inconveniences extending throughout the 
entire two-year tenancy as an excuse to evade his con-
tractual obligation. 
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER 
COURT ARE NOT JUS.TIFIED BY THE EVI-
DENCE OFI RECORD. 
A. There is no evidence presented that such al-
leged inconveniences were "greatly to the de:tri-
ment of Defendant's professional practice" as 
. found by the Court in Findings of Fact XI, XII, 
XIII. 
The Court made.the following Findings of F·act: 
XI 
'·'That Plaintiff permitted to be established 
in the lobby of said building, through which 
defendants, their employees and their clients were 
obliged to pass a barber shop, a shoe shining 
stand and a beauty shop, which gave rise to 
offensive sights and .odors greatly to the detri-
ment of defendants' professional practice and 
which were disagreeable to the defendants, their 
employees and clients." 
XII 
"That the Plaintiff failed to furnish elevator 
service after 8:00 P.M. on week days and on 
Sundays and holidays, which greatly inconven-
ienced the defendants and which was a detriment 
to their professional relationships with clients 
who were, on frequent occasions, obliged to come 
to defendants' offices, located on the third floor 
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of said building by way of the 8ta.irways which 
were, on numerous occasions, totally unlighted 
and also used as a latrine by persons unknown.'' 
XIII 
•'That the plaintiff closed the building on 
Sundays and holidays and after 8 :00 P.M. on 
other days, greatly to the inconvenience of the 
defendants and to the detriment of their profes-
sional relationship with their clients." 
The only evidence submitted as to the result of t~e 
inconveniences was to the effect that complaints ·were 
received from a few clients as to these conditions. 
~Ir. E.vans testified (R. page 30, 31): 
"Q.- Did .you ever receive complaints from your 
clients in that respect~ 
A. Yes, I did receive complaints from my 
clients to waiting out on the street until we 
could come down and let then1 in, and I can 
remember looking back specifically to two 
-occasions, I can remember the individuals 
I had to let in that way. 
Q. Along with others you no longer recall~ 
A. I can't recall every instance I let a client 
in at night, or on Sunday, or a holiday, but 
I do recollect the names of two people and 
one of them was either a little early or I was 
a little late for my appointment and I waited 
some time after arriving at my office, and 
later received a telephone call from him ask-
ing how he could get access to my office and 
I had to inform him if he would meet me at. 
the door I would come down and let him in." 
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And also (R. page 37): 
"Q. Did you ever receive any complaints from 
p.ersons with whom you were doing business 
to getting in to your office~ 
A. Yes, I did receive some complaints particular-
ly from ladies who entered the ·building and 
seeing the barber shop would leave, * * * 
then. I received telephone calls asking how 
they would get into the building and I advised 
them that was the entrance they would come 
in, but there was confusion on the part of the 
people coming in the building." 
Mr. N eslen testified ( R. page "68, 69) : 
"Q. Now, what maneuyers did you have t.o .go 
through. to do business with clients and wit-
nesses, or any other person, during the eve-
nings or Sundays or holidays~ 
A. Well, on those occasions it was necessary 
either to arrange to get the client or the wit-
ness at the. door and give him access, or wait 
· in our office until we received :a call that he 
was downstairs. · 
Q. By the. way, was there any facilities for him 
to contact you from this locked door~ 
A. No, there were no facilities there, no bell, or 
anything of-that nature, and there were occa-
sions when I did have appointments during 
the evening hours, or on Sundays · or holi-
days when I received calls from clients ask-
ing me how they could get into ·the building, 
and then I have gone down and let them in 
and then on several occasions when I was 
going to remain after the conference I have 
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gone down to let then1 out and have returned 
to the office.'' 
Mr. N eslen further testified ( R. page 70, 71) : 
~·Q. Did you ever receive any co1nments, Mr. 
Neslen, from your clients, or any persons 
with whom you '\Yere doing business concern-
ing the entrance, or lobby, or foyer to the 
building·? 
_._\.. Y ~s, I re1nen1ber one particular con1ment 
from a client just. after the barber shop 
moved in there. This client explained to me 
he didn't know whether he was-
A. The nature of the comment was he could 
not tell whether he was entering a barber 
shop, . a clothing store, or an office building." 
Thus, Mr. Evans revealed only one or two com-
plaints as to the locked door and received some· from 
ladies as to the confusing appearance of the entrance. 
Mr. Neslen had received phone calls on evenings, Sun-
days or holidays from clients who asked how they could 
get into the building, and recalled a comment from a 
client as to the confusing n~ture of the entrance~ 
This was all the evidence presented in this regard. 
It is submitted that the testimony does not show a · 
detriment to respondents' practice. At most, it shows 
inconvenience or confusion to a few clients. There is 
not even testimony by respondents that they did, in fact, 
lose business as a result of complaints about conditions. 
The burden is on respondents to .show such a detriment 
to their practice. They have not done so, and it is urged 
that the Trial Court erred in so finding. 
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B. There is no evidence presented to substantiate 
a Fitnding of Fact that Defendants vacated said 
premises "as soon as they could find suitable 
quarters for their use," as found by the Court. 1 
The Court found as fact: 
XVIII 
"That the defendants moved from and va-
cated said premises by reason of the acts and 
omissions. of the plaintiff as soon as they could 
find suitable quarters for their use as attorneys' 
offices." 
The words "as soon as they could find" state a con-
clusion-· i.e. that respondents vacated within a reason-
able time. The testimony of respondents with regard 
to the search for substitute space is as follows : 
In cross-examination, Mr. N eslen testified: 
"Q. Mr. Neslen, I believe you said you had made 
attempts to find other space, just where did 
you inquire~ 
A. I inquired at the Newhouse Building. 
Q. Yes,-
A. And on occasion at the Continental Bank 
Building, but . without any encouragement 
whatsoever until in the Spring of 1950 our 
present space, where we now are, became l 
available at the Continental Bank. 
Q. Did you inquire in any other buildings for 
space other than those two~ 
A. No; those are the only two· I recall where I 
made inquiry; 
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Q. There are other office buildings in S.alt Lake 
City J? 
... \. That is true. 
~[r. Evans testified (R. page 47, 48): 
""Q. Now, I believe you said that you tried to find 
son1e space in son1e other building~ 
... -\.. Yes. 
Q. Among them the Continental Bank Building~ 
A. That is right.· 
Q. You are now in the Continental Bank Build-
ing? 
... i. That is right. 
Q. When did you first find out space was avail~ 
able in the Continental Bank Building for 
you? 
A. I· think it was probably, I am speaking from 
memory, in the month of May, the. early part 
of the month of May, 1950. 
Q. It was about the time you wrote this letter 
designated Exhibit 5, wasn't it~ 
A. It was within, I think, a short time prior to 
the time we wrote this letter. I am not sure 
· of the exact date. We found this space, it 
could have been within two weeks before. 
Q. You did not write this letter until after you 
. found space available in the Continental Bank 
Building~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. After you ·wrote this, you had a discussion 
with Mr. Dayton, did you not~ 
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A. We had a discussion with Mr. Dayton. 
Q. Didn't you ask him if you couldn't get out 
of this lease, you had space in the Continental 
· Bank and wouldn't they let you out on a 
voluntary basis~ 
A. I think that was discussed, yes. 
Q. When you were talking with Mr. Brennan 
of the Continental Bank Building, and when 
he told you there was space in the building, 
didn't you tell him you would have to break 
this lease with the Darling people to come 
over to take his space~ 
A. I did tell Mr. Brennan we did have space 
in the Darling Building, to take this space 
we would have to leave the Darling Building. 
Q. Didn't you tell him you would have to break 
the lease, Mr. Evans~ 
A. I don't remember using that word, Mr. Bill-
ings." 
Mr. Evans further testified (R. page 38): 
·"Q. Now, will you explain to the Court, 1\fr. 
Evans, if these conditions were as obnoxious 
as you have testified, why you failed to leave 
these premises earlier than that date~· 
A. We couldn't get in any other quarters. 
Q. Did you investigate to find other suitable 
quarters~ 
· A. We had inquired about other quarters that 
would accommodate us. We had prior to 
moving particularly contacted the Continent-
al Bank Building about quarters and when 
·quarters became available, we would move." 
If the Findings o~ · Fact stated that respondents 
. vacated "as soon as they did find quarters," it would be 
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a correct state1nent. Then the question would still ~ 
before the Court as to the reasonableness of the time 
of abandon1nent. The question could then be raised 
whether the limited search for quarters was indeed a 
reasonable one, considering the admittedly tight con-
ditions of that date. It is Appellant's contention as shown 
above that such abandonment was not within a reason-
able time. 
Appellants submitted the following substituted find-
ing of fact, which is felt more clearly states the facts 
as developed by respondents' testimony: 
this. 
"That Defendants made an inquiry at the . 
Newhouse Building and frequent inquiries at the 
Continental Bank Building and when a vacancy 
occurred in the. latter building providing them 
with. suitable quarters in that building, they 
Inoved thereto." 
It ·1s submitted that the Court erred in rejecting 
SU11MARY AND CONCLUSION 
Appellants submit that the Court erred in finding 
·any financial detriment to respondents' p,ractice from 
the evidence presented, and from finding as a fact. that 
respondents removed as soon as possible. 
Respondents further submit that the facts as fo~d 
by the Court do not satisfy the demanding tests of the 
term "constructive eviction." Responden:ts based much · 
of their case on acts of omission of Appellant, which 
are legally irrelevant to the question at hand. They 
have failed to present necessary evidence as to the inten-
tion of Appellant to evict, nor may this be implied from 
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the evidence presented. The Court found mere "inade-
quacies" in the services of Appellant, which finding does 
not meet the standard of "grave, substantial a·nd per-
manent" impairment. Moreover, the inadequacies as to 
heat, elevator and janitor service, and the night time 
operation of the building were expressly covered by the 
lease which is controlling in all cases except where 
wanton and flagrant abuse of the discretion allowed 
thereon. F-urther, it is contended respondents waived 
any eviction by remaining in possession for over two 
(2) years despite the continuance of the offensive con-
ditions during this whole period.· R~spondents are not 
excused from earlier removal because of the dearth of 
other office space, when they have not taken exceptional 
steps to meet this exceptional situation, let alone when 
they have confined their effective search for new quar-
ters to one building. 
Any one of these hurdles alone can prevent respond-
ents from reaching their goal. Together they form a 
course which respondents, even when assisted by as able 
a steed as "Trial Court Discretion," cannot successfully 
complete. 
Because of the foregoing, it is submitted that Plain-
tiffs are entitled to a reversal of the judgment of the 
Court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT 
AND MABEY, 
PETER W. BILLINGS, 
ALBER-T J. COLTON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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